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The dissertation begins with discussion of a stylised example of modal discourse. The focus then 
turns to modality in general. The close interrelationship between necessity, possibility and 
contingency is outlined and the familiar notion of possible worlds as a heuristic tool for 
understanding modality is presented. Some generic problems relating to the analysis and 
epistemology of modality are considered. The idea that there are different senses of modality is 
introduced and the alethic/non-alethic and absolute/relative distinctions for senses of 
modalities are highlighted. Finally, five prospective groundings for modality are surveyed: 
primitivism, modal realism, essentialism, conventionalism and deflationism; it is seen that all of 
these accounts have their problems. 
With this preliminary discussion out of the way, attention turns to the specific subject of 
metaphysical possibility and necessity proper. It is argued that the notions have been beset with 
an unfortunate lack of clarity. Much of the confusion has stemmed from the fact that the term 
‘metaphysical modality’ and its cognates are rarely defined clearly. Consequently, usage of this 
terminology has been inconsistent. Sometimes the term has been used interchangeably with 
logical modality; at other times, authors have been keen to distinguish between them. 
Distinctions are drawn between strictly, narrowly and broadly logical modalities. Only the latter 
may be identified with metaphysical modality. Complaints made by Quine about the 
incoherence of modal talk can be challenged by appealing to the distinction between narrowly 
and broadly logical modalities. The significance of alternative logics for metaphysical modality 
is briefly discussed. 
Another point of contention has been the relationship between metaphysical and what might be 
called ‘scientific’ modality, the modality of fundamental science. As the subsequent discussion 
shows, the name can be considered a blanket term, which covers a group of similar modalities: 
physical, nomic or nomological, causal and natural. Having distinguished these, I turn to 
consider the vexed question of whether and to what extent they coincide with metaphysical 
modality. The focus of this debate has centred on whether laws of nature should be considered 
metaphysically necessary or contingent. Even if the key tenets of scientific essentialism are 
granted, then the crux of the debate turns to the existence, or otherwise, of alien properties. The 
division here is seen to hinge on whether a posteriori or a priori methods are most appropriate 
when engaging with modality. 
In order to make sense of this, the relationship between conceptual and metaphysical possibility 
is examined. The deficiencies of the human imagination in assessing possibility are summarised 
before a contrast is made between prima facie and ideal conceivability. It is suggested that the 
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latter entails metaphysical possibility. Finally, the traditional Kripkean separation of conceptual 
possibility within the one-dimensionalist modal framework is compared with the innovations of 
two-dimensionalism. 
I conclude with the observation that although terminology has been inconsistent there are 
reasonable grounds to identify metaphysical modality with that sense of modality which is 
alethic, absolute and all-encompassing in its subject matter. However, the precise extent of 
metaphysical modality remains controversial. Whether it is judged to extend beyond scientific 





“A boy is about to go on his first date, and is nervous about what to talk about. He asks 
his father for advice. The father replies: ‘My son, there are three subjects that always 
work. These are food, family, and philosophy.’ 
The boy picks up his date and they go to a soda fountain. Ice cream sodas in front of 
them, they stare at each other for a long time, as the boy's nervousness builds. He 
remembers his father's advice, and chooses the first topic. He asks the girl: ‘Do you like 
potato pancakes?’ She says ‘No,’ and the silence returns. 
After a few more uncomfortable minutes, the boy thinks of his father's suggestion and 
turns to the second item on the list. He asks, ‘Do you have a brother?’ Again, the girl says 
‘No’ and there is silence once again. 
The boy then plays his last card. He thinks of his father's advice and asks the girl the 
following question: ‘If you had a brother, would he like potato pancakes?’” (Sober, 1992) 
Jokes such as this depend for their success on a well-worn cliché of philosophy as being entirely 
uninterested with the ‘real world’, with things ‘as they actually are’. It is a conception of absent-
minded philosophers concerned with hypothetical and futile thoughts which dates back at least 
to antiquity: Socrates, for example, was parodied as a man with his head in the clouds, utterly 
oblivious to the ordinary events of the world around him (Aristophanes, 2002). As with any 
stereotype, there is a grain of truth contained within it. Philosophers do indeed have a penchant 
for generality. Unfortunately, this inclination towards abstraction sometimes leads to confusion, 
rather than clarity. Arguably, this tendency has manifested itself in philosophical discussions 
involving metaphysical modality. Now, such a sad state of affairs would not be so regrettable 
were it not for the fact that, to judge by the ubiquity of this heady phrase and its variations in 
the literature, the notion clearly plays a vital role in several areas of philosophy. The aim of this 
dissertation is to get to grips with this notion of metaphysical modality. 
Although the notion at hand is supposed to be quite intuitive, neither the word ‘metaphysical’ 
nor ‘modality’ is used very often in ordinary conversation. Therefore, uninitiated readers will be 
forgiven for finding themselves uncertain of what the phrase might mean. A good place to start 
is by considering the boy’s counterfactual question, ‘If you had a brother, would he like potato 
pancakes?’ It is a question which asks what might have been, rather than what is actually the 
case. It therefore departs from purely “categorical” (Melia, 2003, p. 1) talk about the world and 
arrives at so-called ‘modal’ discourse. Accordingly, statements are neither simply true nor 
simply false. Instead, it seems some statements must be true while others merely might be. 
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Thus, there are ‘modes’ of truth, or ways in which statements are true or false. (Sider, 2003, p. 
180) ‘Modality’, then, is the general term used by philosophers and logicians to cover possibility, 
impossibility, necessity and contingency, and, perhaps, other cognates such as essence and 
accident (Garrett, 2011, p. 38). Looking back to our example, in asking his counterfactual 
question during the date, the boy presumably thinks that, although the girl does not actually 
have a brother, there is some reasonable sense in which it is possible for the girl to have had a 
brother (and for that brother to have liked potato pancakes). 
At first sight, departure from categorical discourse is apt to seem frivolous. (Indeed, part of the 
situational humour derives from the apparent absurdity of the boy’s query.) Furthermore, it 
might well be wondered how there could be any sort of sane, sensible way for the girl to have 
replied to such a silly enquiry. The question is, surely, a conversation-stopper. On second 
thoughts, however, it seems there is at least one way in which she could make a stab at a serious 
answer. Her own taste in food, she reasons, is the result of a complex interaction between her 
genes and environment. To the extent that siblings typically resemble each other in these 
respects, their tastes will be similar. Since she does not like potato pancakes, neither will her 
hypothetical brother. So the girl says ‘No,’ yet again. The poor boy’s date is going nowhere fast! 
Of course, the girl’s reasoning here is superficial and her conclusion rather too quick. Marmite, 
famously, is a foodstuff which strongly divides opinion within families: you either love it or hate 
it, or so its marketing would have us believe. Siblings, though similar, are by no means identical 
and the relation between someone’s genes, environment and sense of taste is terrifically 
complicated. Even if the particular egg and sperm originating the fictitious brother were 
specified, current scientific understanding has not yet developed sufficiently to predict 
definitively the specific tastes that he would have. Given this, perhaps the best answer the girl 
could give is ‘I don’t know’. However, the significant point which remains nevertheless is that, 
perhaps contrary to initial appearances, the question is intelligible.1 
In any case, less esoteric and complex questions about ways things might and must be are very 
far from idle. Indeed, along with counterfactuals, modal notions seem to have an important role 
to play in issues ranging from logical consequence to laws of nature, causation and 
supervenience. (Hale & Hoffmann, 2010, p. 1) 
 
                                                             





2.1 Necessity, contingency and possibility 
An important feature of modal notions is that most can be defined in terms of one another. 
Where φ represents a proposition: 
“symbolizing  ⌜It is necessary that φ⌝ as ⌜□ φ⌝, one can define the other modalities 
thus: 
 it is possible that φ:  ~ □ ~ φ 
 it is contingently true that φ: φ & ~ □ φ 
 it is contingently false that φ: ~ φ & ~ □ ~ φ 
 it is impossible that φ:  □ ~ φ 
 it is contingent whether φ: ~ □ φ & ~ □ ~ φ” (Sider, 2003, p. 184) 
Indeed, in the formal languages of the normal modal logics, it is axiomatic that the necessity 
operator (‘□’) and possibility operator (⌜◊ φ⌝ is conventionally used to symbolise ⌜It is 
possible that φ⌝) are logical duals. However, the basic thought which underlies these formal 
apparatus can be appreciated at an intuitive level: it is surely just analytic that, for example, any 
necessary proposition is such that it is not possible for it to be false. 2 
A happy consequence of these equivalences is that our ideological taxonomy can be reduced. We 
may talk of modality overall without worrying about whether what is being said applies only to 
cases of possibility and not to instances of necessity, or vice versa.3 
2.2 Possible worlds 
Although possible worlds are not the only way to elucidate the subject of modality, they are 
certainly the most popular.4 Early precursors of this approach can be found in Carnap’s use of 
                                                             
2 Although it is acknowledged that “the orthodox view in modal logic, and the philosophy of modality, is 
that […] must and […] could are interdefinable and interintelligible” (Loptson, 2001, p. 87), the principle is 
not entirely uncontroversial. For example, Loptson (2001, pp. 87, 93) aligns himself with A. J. Prior in 
refusing to countenance this principle. Unfortunately, I cannot afford to enter into the intricacies of this 
debate in the space available here. 
3 However, this fact notwithstanding, it remains “a good question whether, and if so in what sense or 
senses, possibility is prior to necessity or vice versa. It is also a good question in epistemology whether, 
and if so in what sense or senses, knowledge of possibility is prior to knowledge of necessity, or vice 
versa.” (Garrett, 2011, p. 51 n. 1) Some arguments for the view that knowledge of necessity comes first 
are given by Hale (2002a). Again, I shall not be able to argue about these niceties here. 
4 The most prominent alternative is referred to as ‘modalism’. On this approach, instead of quantifying 
over possible worlds or objects, the modal operators are taken to be primitive terms. For an overview and 
discussion of some of the expressive limitations and intuitive failures and other difficulties of this 
approach, see Melia (2003, pp. 81-98). 
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‘state descriptions’ and “Hintikka’s model sets, or sets of consistent sentences” (Girle, 2003, p. 4) 
but the idea really began to take hold later with the publication of writings by Adams, Kripke, 
Lewis, Plantinga and Stalnaker, amongst others.5 
A classic statement of, and notorious argument for, the position is given by Lewis (1973, p. 84): 
“I believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we happen to inhabit. If an 
argument is wanted, it is this. It is uncontroversially true that things might be otherwise 
than they are. I believe, and so do you, that things could have been different in countless 
ways. But what does this mean? Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are 
many ways things could have been besides the way they actually are. On the face of it, 
this sentence is an existential quantification. It says that there exist many entities of a 
certain description, to wit ‘ways things could have been’. I believe that things could have 
been different in countless ways; I believe permissible paraphrases of what I believe; 
taking the paraphrase at its face value, I therefore believe in the existence of entities that 
might be called ‘ways things could have been’. I prefer to call them ‘possible worlds’.” 
Considerable disagreement persists about whether possible worlds are real or fictional, abstract 
or concrete. 6 Fortunately, although some of these issues will be considered while introducing 
the traditional views of metaphysical modality of Kripke and Lewis, reaching a conclusion on 
these matters is tangential to the main concerns of the dissertation. Instead, possible worlds will 
simply be exploited as an intuitive, heuristic tool for explicating modality. 
2.3 Epistemological difficulties with modality 
An immediate difficulty for those committed to using modal language is epistemological. While 
everything that actually is the case or that actually happens is experienced more or less directly, 
the process of understanding and knowing what might or must happen appears to be far more 
indirect. (Although it is perhaps worth noting that our means of knowledge about concreta are 
different to ways of knowing about abstracta; usually, the former is supposed to be the result of 
some spatiotemporal, causal process of perception; the latter is sometimes thought to be the 
outcome of an analogical process of intuition.) 
Some modal claims can be ruled in or out purely on the basis of observations of actual objects 
and events. If p is actually the case, then it follows that p is possible. Similarly, if ~p is actually 
                                                             
5 See Loux (1979), which collects together many of these important early papers and provides a useful 
introduction to the development of theories of possible worlds as a means of interpreting and 
systematising modal logics. 
6 Divers (2002) offers both a general survey of the various positions and a book length treatment of the 
debate between what he calls genuine realism (GR) and actualist realism (AR).  
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the case, then it follows that p is not necessary. Unfortunately, definitional modal deductions 
such as these are trivial and uninteresting. Philosophers and ordinary individuals are typically 
concerned with more substantive modal claims: with what is necessary or with what is ‘merely’ 
possible (not actual, but possible nevertheless). 
The process of discovering what must be (or what is not but might be) seems to share certain 
similarities with noticing causality or morality. The philosophical literature provides us with a 
standard example for each of these phenomena: a billiard ball rolls along a table top, connects 
with another ball and stops, the other ball begins to roll in the same direction as that in which 
the initial ball rolled; a woman with knife in hand continues to stab at random a man who is 
clearly in great pain. If presented with these putative instances of causation and immorality, the 
oddness of responding ‘Where is the causation?’ or ‘Where is the wrongness?’ in each respective 
case is of a very different kind to the incongruity of asking ‘Where are the billiard balls?’ or 
‘Where are the people?’ While asking the latter questions seems to betray delusion or linguistic 
incompetence, the former responses are deemed intelligible – although it is perhaps a sure sign 
that the respondent in question is a philosopher. 
Famously, causation and morality were understood by Hume to be nothing more than 
projections of our subjective sentiments onto the world rather than objective features of reality. 
It is no coincidence that an expressivist theory of modality was proposed by someone who 
considers himself to be an intellectual heir to Hume. (Blackburn, 1986, pp. 122-123) 
The more general insight, however, should certainly be acknowledged and preserved. If it is to 
be successful, a theory of modality will have to be able to account for the common-sense 
platitude that many modal claims are known. A plausible metaphysical theory of modality 
should be able to integrate a plausible epistemological story about how modal statements are 
known: “the two accounts must […] dovetail” (Peacocke, 1997, p. 522). 
2.4 Analytical difficulties with modality 
Any theorist who aims to explain or reduce modality in more familiar terms seems to face an 
insuperable predicament which is essentially a customised version of the famous Euthyphro 
dilemma (Blackburn, 1986, pp. 120-121). It is easiest to illustrate this argument by focussing on 
the example of necessity. Either the necessity will be explained by another necessity or it will be 
explained by a non-necessity. Taking the first horn, it is clear that the source of some necessity 
or other can flow from that of another; but it is also clear that the source of necessity simpliciter 
cannot ever be explained in this way. Taking the second horn, if the ground of necessity is 
reduced to something which is contingent, then the original mark of necessity threatens to 
disintegrate and disappear. Either way, it looks like necessity cannot be analysed. 
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Although this argument seems to be a more fundamental problem than the epistemological 
concerns, it has received short shrift from philosophers who have argued against it quite 
convincingly (Cameron, 2010a). Constructing a plausible theory of modal epistemology, 
however, has proved more demanding and this matter is far from settled. 
2.5 Senses of modality 
I hope the modal part of our present subject has at least been clarified a little and it is somewhat 
clearer why it has been thought problematic. Until now, the metaphysical part has not yet been 
touched upon. In the discussion above, it was assumed that the boy thought it was ‘in some 
sense possible’ for the girl to have had a brother. However, it was not specified precisely quite 
what the sense of possibility in play was. A popular suggestion is that there are several different 
senses of possibility and necessity and that these can be disambiguated by context. A fanciful 
aeronautical example will serve to illustrate the basic idea: 
“you might well want to say that ‘it is impossible for me to fly’ is true or false depending 
upon the context you are in. For instance, if I tried to leap from a rooftop, confident that I 
would fly like an eagle and land safely on the ground, you would (I hope!) try and 
dissuade me on the grounds that I cannot fly – that it is impossible for me to do so. 
However, in other contexts the sentence does not seem to be true. For instance, we 
might engage in a theological debate over what an omnipotent being could, or could not, 
bring about. There we might agree that such a being could endow me with the ability to 
fly. In that context, then, the sentence seems to be false – I could fly under those 
circumstances: it is not impossible at all.” (Beebee, Effingham, & Goff, 2011, p. 168) 
The two senses of modality present in this example can be identified more directly by using 
adjectives. Thus, flying is a logical possibility for me but not a nomological possibility. Very 
roughly, this is because my flying is compatible with the laws of logic (since it contains no overt 
contradiction) but not with the laws of nature (because my constitution prevents me 
overcoming the force of gravity). Which kind of modality is in play and hence which laws are 
relevant will depend upon the interests of the participants in a given conversational situation. 
Following this pattern, it seems appropriate to describe metaphysical possibility as that which 
is compatible with the laws of metaphysics. Such a sense of possibility will be pertinent when 
metaphysics, that paragon of philosophy, is discussed. However, this leaves unanswered the 
awkward question of exactly what metaphysics consists in and what its laws are supposed to be. 
On its own, then, this suggestion is not very informative. 
As was mentioned above, there seem to be many senses of possibility and necessity: 
“Philosophers commonly talk at least about metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, logical, 
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physical, mathematical, biological, technological, normative and natural modality” (Tahko, p. 2). 
In fact, a trawl through some of the literature reveals that philosophers also talk about: “broadly 
deontic modalities […]not only the moral modalities but legal modalities and other modalities of 
permission and obligation” (Divers, 2002, p. 7), “doxastic modalities. The ‘might’ of a doxastic 
modality […] is what the belief system (of an individual, at a time) does not rule out” (Divers, 
2002, p. 7); bouletic or connative modalities: “bouletic possibility [is] what is compatible with a 
person’s desires” (Swanson, 2008, p. 1195), “a connatively possible world is one that conforms 
to my actual desires by making them come true” (Divers, 2002, p. 7); temporal modalities: 
“historical necessity, that form of necessity for which the past is ‘closed’ yet the future may be 
‘open’” (Fine, 2002, p. 255) and “tense-logical modalities” (Fine, 2002, p. 255); “causal 
modalities: some events are causally necessary – or determined” (Tooley, 1999, p. vii); 
“analytical modalities: it is analytically necessary that bachelors are single” (Tooley, 1999, p. 
vii). There are bound to be others mentioned elsewhere. And it is easy to think of further 
examples: although it was previously a subject of considerable controversy, it is now known to 
be humanly possible to run a four-minute mile. 
With so many different senses of modality apparently present, it is worth asking how many of 
them are genuinely distinct and how they are interrelated. However, consideration of all of the 
senses above is well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Consequently, I refrain from 
discussing those varieties of modality which no philosopher has ever thought to confuse with 
metaphysical modality. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning two devices which can help to 
provide some sort of structure to this proliferation of modalities. 
2.5.1 Alethic and non-alethic modalities 
The first useful distinction among modalities is between the alethic and non-alethic. Where ‘M’ 
stands for a particular sense of modality: 
“The alethic modalities are those kinds of modality for which the actual world is always 
one of the M-possible worlds that it generates: the constraints generated from the actual 
world are always satisfied by the actual world. All other kinds of modality are non-
alethic.” (Divers, 2002, p. 6) 
All parties are agreed that metaphysical modality is alethic. The trivial modal truths discussed in 
the section on epistemological difficulties with modality are illustrative. There it was argued 
that it follows from the fact that p is actually the case, that it is possible. Strictly speaking, this 
sort of result only holds when the modality in question is alethic. In contrast, non-alethic 
modalities do not have this consequence. The archetypal example of this is normative or deontic 
modality: if p is actual, it does not follow that p is permissible. 
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2.5.2 Absolute and relative modalities 
Within the realm of alethic modality, another important distinction is between absolute and 
relative modalities. An absolute necessity is such that there is no genuine sense in which it is 
possible for it to be false. A relative necessity is such that there is a sense in which it is possible 
for it to be false. It has been traditional to hold that metaphysical necessity is absolute although 
its claims to being so have been challenged by some (Hale, 1996). 
The aeronautical example above should help to make the contrast between absolute and 
relative modalities clearer. It was suggested that flying is logically possible but nomologically 
impossible. If this suggestion is correct, nomological modality is relative. Although it is 
nomologically necessary that I cannot fly, there is a (logical) sense in which it is possible for me 
to do so. The same point can be expressed in terms of strength and weakness. Logical necessity 
is stronger than physical necessity because logical necessity entails physical necessity but not 
vice versa. Corresponding to the fact that necessity and possibility are logical duals, logical 
possibility is also weaker than physical possibility since physical possibility entails logical 
possibility and not vice versa. Expressed in terms of possible worlds, the set of nomologically 
possible worlds with the same laws of nature comprise a proper subset of the set of all the 
logically possible worlds with the same laws of logic. Nomological possibility seems to be 
restricted, whereas logical possibility seems unrestricted. 
Of course, this understanding of the logically and nomologically possible worlds has been highly 
simplified here for the sake of discussion. As we shall see in our comparisons of metaphysical 
modality with these modalities, the notion that there might be possible worlds with laws of 
nature at variance to our own, for example, has been contested. 
2.6 Grounds of modality 
In light of the apparent epistemological and analytical difficulties mentioned above, many 
different accounts of what grounds modals claims have emerged. To orientate the reader, it 
should be helpful to summarise the most prominent proposals: modal primitivism, modal 
realism, essentialism, conventionalism and deflationism.7 
The first approach is to take modal talk as more or less primitive.  On this account, the 
distinction between claims about what might be or must be the case from what is actually the 
case is incapable of being explained in more primitive vocabulary. To adopt this position is to 
accept that “Explanations come to an end somewhere” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 6: §1). The 
obvious worry from a theoretical perspective is that this endpoint is premature: “After all, it’s 
                                                             
7 I am indebted to Cameron (2010b) in setting out these particular options. 
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easy to just take the distinction as primitive, and there’s not that much to say about such a view 
other than that it is preferable to give an account of something if you can” (Cameron, 2010b, p. 
349). 
A second approach is to ground modality in the literal existence of causally isolated concrete 
possible worlds which represent every possibility. The costs and benefits of modal realism 
(Lewis, 1986) are pretty well rehearsed. Although it seems to reduce modality to more primitive 
vocabulary, it does so at the cost of exploding our common-sense ontology. And it also causes 
problems for modal epistemology since it is unclear how we come to know about the nature and 
events of other concrete possible worlds in any sort of naturalistic fashion. Having said this, 
Lewis is right to argue that this problem affects abstractionist accounts of possible worlds as 
well and that it is a quite general problem for any realistic interpretation of modality. 
Recognising contingencies seems to be a very different process to knowing necessary truths. 
Another option is to ground modal talk in essentialist notions. Although it has been traditional 
to explain facts about the essential and accidental features of objects by reference to possible 
worlds, Fine (1994) has argued that essentialism is prior to modality since possible worlds 
cannot properly distinguish essential properties. For example, it is plausible that in every 
possible world in which he exists, Socrates is human and the sole member of the set containing 
Socrates. On a possible worlds account, both these properties are essential to Socrates. “But, 
intuitively, this is not so. It is no part of the essence of Socrates to belong to the singleton.” (Fine, 
1994, pp. 4-5) However, it is not clear that going in the other direction and reducing modality to 
essence is very useful either since the vocabulary of essentialism seems to be just as much in 
need of explanation as does the vocabulary of modality. 
Faced with the epistemological difficulties which seem to beset alternative accounts, 
conventionalists about modality have argued that facts about necessity and possibility merely 
reflect our linguistic commitments. On this account, necessary propositions “do not make any 
assertion about the empirical world. They simply record our determination to use words in a 
certain fashion. We cannot deny them without infringing the conventions which are 
presupposed by our very denial, and so falling in to self-contradiction.” (Ayer, 2001, p. 80) The 
story is typically supplemented with additional detail to account for the necessary a posteriori 
(Sidelle, 1989). The view is attractive since it seems to remove the mystery of necessity. 
However, the trouble with this approach is that it is susceptible to a problem raised by Quine 
(1966b). All that linguistic convention can do is to translate one truth into another; it does not 
explain the truth or necessity of any statement at all: “It’s because of how the world is that all 
unmarried men are unmarried, and all the unmarried men would be unmarried no matter what 
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linguistic conventions we adopted when choosing how to describe the world” (Cameron, 2010b, 
p. 354). 
A final deflationary, or neo-conventionalist, alternative is to adopt the “convention to call logical, 
analytic and mathematical truths necessary […] ‘Necessary’ would be a word used for truths of 
certain kinds.” (Sider, 2003, p. 204) On this account “there is nothing special about the 
necessary truths as opposed to the contingent ones: there is no deep metaphysical division to be 
drawn between those truths that could have been otherwise and those that couldn’t” (Cameron, 
2010b, p. 355). The difficulty with this approach is that it effectively commits us to an error 
theory on the subject of modality. Somehow we have all been mistaken in thinking that there is 
some real significance to necessity and possibility. This consequence is arguably too radical. 
None of the options surveyed here are entirely without cost which explains why there is such a 
divergence of opinion. While a complete analysis would graph the consequences of these 
general positions for metaphysical modality in particular, reasons of space prohibit this. As it is, 
the discussion of metaphysical modality will largely float free of these matters. 
3 Metaphysical modality 
It was mentioned earlier that grasping the sense of metaphysical modality is far from easy. The 
problem is widely acknowledged in the literature: 
“Unfortunately, there are many different notions of possibility (and necessity) […] we 
are only concerned with one of them, a perfectly ordinary notion that we will call 
‘metaphysical’ possibility (and necessity). Despite its ordinary status, it isn’t easy to 
characterize metaphysical possibility directly, without appealing to less familiar 
notions.” (Jubien, 1997, p. 130) 
“Exactly what is metaphysically impossible beyond logical and analytic contradictions is 
unclear; this unclarity is what makes the analysis of metaphysical possibility and 
necessity so difficult. But it is metaphysical possibility and necessity that most concerns 
philosophers.” (Sider, 2003, p. 182) 
“Thus it is controversial whether the collection of all (and only) the genuinely possible 
worlds can be identified with the logically possible worlds, or with the analytically 
possible worlds, or with the metaphysically possible worlds, etc.” (Divers, 2002, p. 5) 
An obvious way to proceed would be to clarify the meaning of ‘metaphysical’. There are at least 
three ways this might be done: the etymological approach, the big-picture approach, and the 
definition-by-example approach. (Carroll & Markosian, 2010, p. 4) Unfortunately, it is accepted 
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that none of these are particularly enlightening. The etymological approach which identifies 
metaphysics with the topics which happened to be published in a book by Aristotle does not 
explain what unites the disparate topics, the big-picture appeal to the ultimate nature of reality 
is inherently vague and the definition-by-example somewhat arbitrary.8 
Perhaps these remarks serve to explain why “the notion of metaphysical possibility […] is 
standardly taken to be primitive.” (Gendler & Hawthorne, 2002, p. 4) Whether metaphysical 
modality turns out to be irreducible, however, the process of establishing that clearly should 
help to enlighten the subject. At the very least, it should help to explain its relationship with 
other, apparently similar modalities of logic and physics with which it is apt to be compared or 
conflated. 
The notion of metaphysical modality arguably originated in the work of Kripke and Lewis. At 
least, it is these authors with which the notion has been most closely associated. When the topic 
arises, it is not unusual for philosophers to reference them explicitly: Leeds writes that “the 
notion of necessity I am calling ‘metaphysical’ [is] that of, e.g. Kripke and Lewis” (Leeds, 2007, p. 
282 n. 2). Given the differences between these authors on modal matters, however, it is curious 
that the notion of metaphysical modality is so often gestured at in this way. It is surely better to 
set out how and why their conceptions differ than to point to some rough amalgam of their 
views. 
3.1 Kripke on metaphysical modality 
In Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke introduced metaphysical modality by drawing a 
contrast between epistemological and metaphysical matters. Previously, modal and epistemic 
notions had been so closely intertwined that philosophers often failed to distinguish them. It 
was so widely supposed that all necessary truths are a priori and all contingent truths a 
posteriori, that the fact that the first and second pairs of terms were often used interchangeably 
hardly seemed to matter. Kripke broke the chains linking analyticity, apriority and necessity 
and untied the ropes yoking together the synthetic, the a posteriori and contingent. He 
demonstrated that the metaphysical categories of necessity and contingency can be mixed and 
matched with the epistemological categories of apriority and aposteriority. Consequently, 
statements could be classified in the following ways: 
                                                             
8 Lowe (2001, p. 2) emphasises the extent to which conceptions of the subject matter of metaphysics 
would vary depending on the textbook one happened to pick up. (Perhaps what is therefore needed is a 
more thorough literature survey. This sounds like good, honest naturalised epistemology of which Quine 
would approve – though Lowe has his arguments against scientism and semanticism. Wittgenstein would 
no doubt be unsurprised that the ‘family resemblance’ of such a subject would be so disparate and 
accidental given it is an archetypal example of language going on holiday. 
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Necessary a priori: ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’, ‘all bachelors are unmarried men’ 
Necessary a posteriori: ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, ‘water is H2O’, ‘cats are animals’ 
Contingent a posteriori: ‘a cat is on a mat’, ‘Aristotle was a student of Plato’ 
Contingent a priori: ‘the standard metre bar is one metre long’, ‘I am here’ 
The upshot of Kripke’s discussion was revolutionary: logical positivism, already in decline, gave 
up the ghost and in its place the viability of metaphysics was resurrected. The existence of a 
posteriori necessities had a particularly dramatic effect. Previously, it had been widely supposed 
that all that philosophers could achieve was an appreciation of various nominal essences which 
are nothing more than artefacts of our use of language. Subsequently, our capacity to make 
genuine discoveries about real essences and to ‘carve nature at the joints’ became broadly 
accepted.9 
The Kripkean distinction between the epistemological and the metaphysical has important 
consequences. Although it might be epistemically possible that something is the case, it does not 
follow that it is metaphysically possible. For example, given that the Goldbach conjecture has 
not yet been proved, “we can say […] right now, as far as we know, the question can come out 
either way” (Kripke, 1980, p. 37). But this epistemic possibility has no bearing whatsoever on 
whether “there is an even number, n, greater than 2, such that for no primes p1 and p2, both < n, 
does n = p1 + p2” (Kripke, 1980, p. 36) because the latter is a metaphysical matter. If there is 
such a number, then the Goldbach conjecture is false and necessarily so on an ordinary 
understanding of the nature of mathematics. 
Kripke was rarely explicit about using ‘metaphysical’ as a qualifier of modality. At one point he 
does write that “In fact, any animal looking just like a tiger is a tiger – as far as I know – though it 
is (metaphysically) possible that there should have been animals that resembled tigers but were 
not tigers” (Kripke, 1980, pp. 137-138) but his other claims of sortal, constitution, origin and 
kind essentialisms were really interpreted as archetypal examples of metaphysical necessities. 
They are now standardly introduced as such in the most elementary textbooks (Garrett, 2011, p. 
41). It is not clear whether Kripke intended these case studies to constitute a natural grouping 
of metaphysical modality and he did not consider his various examples to be exhaustive of any 
such notion. Nevertheless, the notion of metaphysical modality stuck; regardless of its 
unnaturalness.10 It is also worth mentioning, finally, that the arguments Kripke put forward 
                                                             
9 Of course there are dissenters. Sidelle (1989, pp. 1-24) contrasts this realist interpretation with his own 
conventionalist account of the necessary a posteriori. 
10 See Lewis (1983) for an explication of the importance of naturalness. 
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both in his magnum opus and an earlier paper (Kripke, 1971) were intended to establish the 
essential and accidental properties of objects as perfectly objective. 
3.2 Lewis on metaphysical modality 
The notion of metaphysical modality Lewis developed is in many ways quite different. Kripke 
maintained a focus on the actual world and considered alternative, abstract metaphysical 
possibilities from that perspective. Lewis, due to his commitment to a plurality of concrete 
possible worlds, adopted a more generalised perspective on metaphysical modality. Lewis 
appreciated that in everyday modal reasoning, use is rarely made of the entirety of logical space: 
“All hands agree that very often our modalities are quantifications restricted to 
‘accessible’ worlds – we tacitly ignore worlds where the past differs, where the actual 
laws of nature are violated, where there are alien natural properties, or what have you” 
(Lewis, 1986, p. 240). 
Significantly, however, the realm of metaphysical modality is determined in exactly the same 
way. For Lewis, that which is metaphysically possible is determined by those accessibility 
relations between possible worlds with which metaphysicians are typically concerned. In other 
words, metaphysical modality is constrained by the laws of metaphysics as stated by 
metaphysicians. Facts about the essential and accidental properties of objects are similarly 
determined since it is up to us which counterpart relations between possibilia we choose to pay 
attention to. Thus, considered as a human being I will have a certain set of counterparts 
(individuals in other possible worlds that resemble me in this respect) that are possibilities for 
me. Considered as a wearer of T-shirts, the possibilities for me are quite different. Of course, 
some counterpart relations will be more natural than others but the view is nevertheless quite 
different from the essentialism of Kripke. 
A final contrast between Lewis and Kripke can be found in their different conceptions of the 
nature of the relationship between epistemic and metaphysical modality. For Lewis, 
“Metaphysical and (for instance) epistemic possibilities […] are not things of two different sorts. 
They are possibilia out of the same plurality of worlds. The difference is in the accessibility” 
(Lewis, 1986, p. 234). 
3.3 On the need for further theory 
These brief outlines of the Kripkean and Lewisian approaches to understanding metaphysical 
modality serve as no more than an introduction. In particular, the precise relationship between 
metaphysical modality and such apparently very similar modalities as logical modality and 
physical modality is in need of development. Much of the obscurity is due to the elusive quality 
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of asides made by Kripke himself. His work is often more suggestive than conclusive and raises 
as many questions as it answers. At various points Kripke contrasts logical with physical 
modality, and the latter with modality tout court without making any definite commitments on 
these matters. The relationship between metaphysical possibility and conceptual possibility is 
also in need of clarification. It would be good to know whether metaphysical modality is 
synonymous or coextensive with any of these other notions. Furthermore, the contrast between 
the absolute sounding nature of Kripkean metaphysical modality, of modality tout court, with 
the more relative sounding Lewisian notion deserves further exploration. 
Before concluding this section, it is worth mentioning that Kripke did have a reason for hedging 
his bets on these and other topics. The reason, a pronounced scepticism toward philosophical 
theorising in general, can be found in his comment on the cluster concept theory of names: 
“It really is a nice theory. The only defect I think it has is probably common to all 
philosophical theories. It's wrong. You may suspect me of proposing another theory in 
its place; but I hope not, because I'm sure it's wrong too if it is a theory.” (Kripke, 1980, 
p. 64) 
For Kripke, the key to successful philosophical inquiry is to paint pictures rather than to 
construct detailed theories. It is unlikely he would have been at all put out if the admonishment 
“This theory is boldly sketched rather than precisely stated” (Grice & Strawson, 1956, p. 154) 
aimed at Quine, were directed at him. Other philosophers have been more scathing of this sort 
of approach which paints in broad brushstrokes and tends to depend on philosophical instinct 
as much as philosophical reason. As one detractor argues, “it is hard to understand why Naming 
and Necessity made such a difference, since it […] relies far more on intuition than on argument 
to support its claims” (Gutting, 2009, p. 50). 
Such strong criticism of the broad brushstrokes approach to philosophy is surely unwarranted 
but for the philosophical optimist, the pessimism exuded by Kripke is no less unjustified. Since it 
is plausibly the job of philosophy to systematise our ordinary thought and talk about the world, 
bringing theory and everyday practice into some form of reflective equilibrium (Rawls, 1971), 
“an abstinence from theorizing” (Lewis, 1973, p. 85) will not do. Proceeding in the hope that 
more can be done to enlighten metaphysical possibility than has already been said, it will be 






4 Distinguishing metaphysical modality: a reader’s guide 
In a survey of the topic of modal epistemology, it has been noted that: 
“there is a confusing range of terms, such as ‘epistemic’, ‘conceptual’, and ‘logical’, that 
are used to qualify possibility by different authors to mean different things in different 
contexts. […] For some views, these distinctions are important, for some they are not. 
[…] The moral is: caveat lector!” (Evnine, 2008, p. 683 n. 17) 
No doubt this is always a good rule to follow but of rather limited utility to the novice student of 
metaphysical modality. What is really needed here is a sort of reader’s guide that will help the 
neophyte to distinguish metaphysical modality from some very similar notions in the 
philosophical literature on modality, avoid potential misunderstandings and highlight any 
significant points of interest along the way. Such a lexical examination, if it is to be at all 
worthwhile, must predominantly be concerned with genuine discovery rather than arbitrary 
stipulation. However, if it is to be at all helpful, the inquiry must also legislate on any disputes 
that can plausibly be resolved. It is intended that the discussion contained within this section 
will go some way towards filling this gap in the market. It is hoped that the interpretation which 
results will be worth the wait of the scholar. 
4.1 Logical modality 
Metaphysical modality is most likely to be conflated with logical modality. Various writers have 
either decried any apparent distinction as nothing more than “a transatlantic squabble [due to] 
a stronger tendency in America to restrict the word ‘logical’ to a narrower range than it is 
restricted to by many English philosophers” (Reinhardt, 1978, p. 218 n. 1)11 or at least declared 
they “shall not distinguish logical impossibility from metaphysical impossibility” (Slote, 1974, p. 
1 n. 2). Such a debacle is perhaps forgivable given that there is indeed a sense of logical modality 
according to which it is fairly interchangeable with metaphysical modality. 
However, logical modality is a far from univocal notion and it is worthwhile spelling out just 
how the many distinct notions of logical modality differ from each other for several reasons. 
Firstly, doing so eliminates the chance of mistaking metaphysical modality for those notions of 
logical modality with which it is certainly not to be identified. Secondly, it suggests that 
complaints, such as those made by Quine, about the incoherence of modality in general can 
                                                             
11 Although I have not done an empirical study, the claim that the discrepancy is transatlantic seems far 
from generally the case given that Lewis, who was both American and furthermore a student of Quine, 




largely be seen as a result of failing to properly separate logical and metaphysical modality. 
Thirdly, appreciating how notions of logical modality are affected by the prevalence of 
alternative logics holds significant lessons for understanding metaphysical modality. The 
ensuing discussion proceeds in accordance with this script. 
4.1.1 Strictly logical modality 
Any detailed characterisation of the nature of logic is bound to be contentious. Historically, it 
has been traditional to understand it as disclosing the structure of right reason and, for those of 
a Rationalist persuasion, of reality. In modern times, the subject has become more of a technical 
enterprise with its advanced topics sharing an affinity with mathematics. More recently, it has 
become customary to see things in a way which incorporates both perspectives: as a subject 
which is concerned with the formalisation of arguments. Symbols and rules for their 
manipulation are introduced with the aim of extracting what is essential in complex arguments 
of ordinary language. Through this process of simplification and systematisation, by abstracting 
from extraneous information, the strength of arguments is able to be assessed more easily. At 
least, this is the ambition. Careful interpretation is required to ensure that the logic which 
results accurately represents the original arguments, that no meaning pertinent to the 
effectiveness of the original arguments is lost and the truth or falsity of the original premises are 
preserved in translation. In this vein, then, “a logic is an artificial language with a semantics” 
(Girle, 2003, p. 5). 
By far the most standard and widespread logic, which results from the work of Frege, Russell 
and Whitehead (Girle, 2003, p. 195 n. 5), is classical first-order predicate logic. It provides rules 
and symbols for negation, conjunction, disjunction, material implication, material equivalence, 
quantification, and it is often supplemented with notation to represent identity. Whenever a 
choice of logic is not explicitly specified, it is fair to assume that it this logic which is in play. 
Strictly logical modality can be understood as compatibility or consistency with the laws of this 
logic alone. Consequently, all tautologies within this logical system will be strictly logically 
necessary, all contradictions will be strictly logically impossible and everything else will be 
strictly logically contingent. A few examples, involving only propositional logic for the sake of 
simplicity, should make this clear. ‘If it is raining, then it is raining’ is strictly logically necessary 
since it has the form of the tautology ⌜p ⊃ p⌝. ‘It is raining and it is not raining’ is strictly 
logically impossible since it has the form of the contradiction ⌜p & ~ p⌝. ‘It is raining’ is strictly 
logically contingent since it has the form ⌜p⌝. 
The requirements for strict logical necessity are exigent, only logical truths count. 
Corresponding to this, the notion of possibility which results from this account is incredibly 
permissive. As a consequence, many statements which are intuitively necessary are not strictly 
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logically necessary and many which are intuitively contradictory are nevertheless classified as 
strictly logically possible. For instance, there “is no strict formal contradiction involved in a 
supposition to the effect that bachelors may be married. The meanings of noun phrases are 
irrelevant to strictly logical modalities.” (McLeod, 2001, p. 155) In other words, strictly logical 
modality is concerned only with purely logical syntax and the effect of the logical constants. 
‘There are married bachelors’ has the form ⌜(∃x)(Bx & Mx)⌝ which, in the absence of suitable 
definitions to the effect that ⌜(∀x)(Bx ⊃ ~ Mx)⌝, is strictly logically possible. 
Results such as these have led many philosophers to question whether strictly logical modality 
should be considered as a genuine variety of modality at all. 12 On this account, some qualifiers 
of modality are akin to alienans adjectives. To adapt a famous example, we cannot safely 
predicate of a logical possibility what we predicate of a possibility “any more than we can 
predicate of a forged banknote or a putative father what we predicate of a banknote or a father” 
(Geach, 1956, p. 55). 
4.1.2 Narrowly logical modality 
What was lacking from strictly logical modality was the recognition that the meanings of 
ordinary words have a role to play in addition to that of the logical constants in determining 
whether or not a statement is possible or necessary. Narrowly logical modality fulfils this role. 
To give an example, 
“‘It is not the case both that Ferdy is a female fox and that Ferdy is not a female fox’ is 
strictly logically necessary, because it is an instance of [the law of non-contradiction]. By 
contrast, ‘It is not the case both that Ferdy is a vixen and that Ferdy is not a female fox’ is 
only narrowly logically necessary […] because it can only be turned into an instance of 
that law by drawing on the definition of ‘vixen’, which is a non-logical term.” (Lowe, 
2001, pp. 14-15) 
A decision needs to be taken here between understanding narrowly logical modality as an 
extension of, or as distinct from, strictly logical modality. In other words, a choice needs to be 
made between restricting narrowly logical modality to examples which involve the implicit or 
explicit definition of ordinary words and synonymy in some shape or form, and allowing 
narrowly logical modality to encompass strictly logical modality as well. Adopting the latter 
convention has two benefits. It means narrowly logical necessity can be identified both with the 
traditional notion of “an analytic truth, being true solely in virtue of its meaning” (Haack, 1978, 
                                                             
12 In particular, Rinaldi (1967) and Seddon (1972) spring to mind.  
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p. 172) and with “the ‘conceptually’ necessary [as] that which is true solely in virtue of concepts 
together with the laws of logic” (Lowe, 2001, p. 14).13 
Unfortunately, use of this terminology is very far from universal. Many philosophers elide this 
distinction between strict and narrow logical modality, preferring to use the name of the latter 
to describe the former and perhaps to use some other adjective to describe the latter. Two 
random samples should serve to illustrate this phenomenon: “narrowly logical consistency or 
narrowly logical implication […] is consistency under some reinterpretation or other of all but 
the logical vocabulary, or implication that is invariant under all such reinterpretations” (Lewis, 
1986, pp. 152-153) and “logical necessity in the narrow sense […] is the sense in which it is 
necessary that anything red is red, though not necessary that nothing red is green or that I am a 
person” (Fine, 2002, p. 254). But for the confusion that alternative jargons generate for 
newcomers and the increased risk of mistaking arguments which are merely semantic for 
substantive ones, this situation should not be considered too disastrous. Things are different if it 
leads philosophers to entirely rule out the notion of broadly logical modality or to confound it 
with the aforementioned notions. 
4.1.3 Broadly logical modality 
The notion of broadly logical modality was first introduced in a passage which, for purposes of 
exegesis, is worth quoting in full: 
“But the sense of necessity in question – call it ‘broadly logical necessity’ is wider than 
this. Truths of set theory, arithmetic and mathematics generally are necessary in this 
sense, as are a host of homelier items such as 
No one is taller than himself 
Red is a colour 
If a thing is red, then it is coloured 
No numbers are human beings 
and 
No prime minister is a prime number. 
And of course there are many propositions debate about whose status has played an 
important role in philosophical discussion – for example 
                                                             
13 For the sake of completeness, the notion of analyticity involved here is broad, as opposed to narrow, 
analyticity: what “is reducible to a logical truth by substitution of synonyms for synonyms [is] narrowly 
analytic; […] broad analyticity […] is logical truth plus narrow analyticity.” (Haack, 1978, p. 173) 
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Every person is conscious at some time or other 
Every human person has a body 
No one has a private language 
There never was a time when there was space but no material objects 
and 
There exists a being than which it is not possible that there be a greater. 
So the sense of necessity in question is wider than that captured in first order logic.” 
(Plantinga, 1974, p. 2) 
It should be evident from these suggested cases of broadly logical modality that the notion is far 
richer and more complex than the preceding, thinner notions of logical modality. While it is 
fairly straightforward to classify statements into strictly logical and narrowly logical categories, 
the boundaries of broadly logical modality are highly contentious. The basic explanation for this 
is that broadly logical modality involves consideration of the natures of things and our 
knowledge and understanding of exactly what many such objects and events as gods, persons, 
consciousness, time and space are is very far from perfect. As a result, broadly logical modality 
patently strays from the previous two notions. While the latter notions emanate from purely 
formal and definitional concerns, the former stems from matters of substance. The transition 
from narrowly to broadly logical modality signals a shift from the analytic to the synthetic. 
Just like before, there is a question about whether broadly logical modality should be 
considered as an extension of narrowly logical modality or as distinct from it. Selecting the 
former option once again means that, despite the stark contrast noted above, strictly, narrowly 
and broadly logical modalities remain interconnected: strictly logical necessity entails narrowly 
logical necessity, which entails broadly logical necessity; moreover, strictly logical possibility is 
entailed by narrowly logical possibility, which is entailed by broadly logical possibility. 
There are two vital points to appreciate about broadly logical modality. Firstly, it is this notion 
which is required for a proper understanding of possible worlds, which governs “logical space, 
the totality of the worlds in all their glory” (Lewis, 1986, p. 73). Secondly, it is not implausible to 
suggest that broadly logical modality is equivalent to metaphysical modality. Hence, 
“logical necessity in the broad sense […] is sometimes called ‘metaphysical’ necessity […] 
the sense of necessity that obtains in virtue of the identity of things (broadly conceived) 
[…] in this sense it is necessary not only that anything red is red or that nothing is both 
red and green, but also that I am [a] person or that 2 is a number.” (Fine, 2002, p. 254) 
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Since, in addition, such archetypal examples of metaphysical necessity as ‘Water is H2O’, 
‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ and ‘This pain is mine’ are considered specimens of broadly logical 
necessity (Lowe, 2001, p. 15), this equation seems wholly appropriate. Nevertheless, it is 
arguable whether metaphysical necessity should embrace the strictly and narrowly logical 
necessities. Omitting them does serve to emphasise a considerable epistemological divergence – 
between the a priori quality of conceptual necessity and the often a posteriori character of 
metaphysical necessity – but “respect for the usage of other philosophers [demands] the first 
option” (Lowe, 2001, p. 16). This identity of broadly logical and metaphysical is not entirely 
uncontroversial given the arguments of Hale (1996). However, an important consequence of 
this move would be to dissolve his worries about the status of metaphysical modality. Indeed, 
“in later work Hale (2002b) seems much more sympathetic” (Tahko, p. 15) to this sort of 
interpretation. 
4.1.4 Quinean doubts about modality 
Granted that suspicions about the intelligibility or coherence of modality in general will carry 
over to specific varieties of modality including metaphysical modality in particular, it would be 
valuable if such doubts could be assuaged. Perhaps the most significant consequence of 
separating out the aforementioned varieties of logical modality is to show that this can indeed 
be done. Quine has been the most vociferous critic of modality but by distinguishing strict and 
narrow logical modalities from broadly logical or metaphysical modality many of his worries 
can be mitigated. 
Quine had several reasons to be sceptical of modality. Underlying many of them were doubts 
about the viability of any distinction between analytic and synthetic statements (Quine, 1961b) 
which it would take us too far afield to consider here. However, there were also more specific 
concerns about modality. The solution to these perplexities is to recognise that the complaints 
afflict only the strict and narrow logical modalities. The first problem concerned quantification 
into intensional contexts and the claim that modal operators created such contexts. As Quine 
writes, 
“According to the strict sense of ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’, these statements would be 
regarded as true: 
(15) 9 is necessarily greater than 7, 
(16) Necessarily if there is life on the Evening Star then there is life on the Evening Star, 
(17) The number of planets is possibly less than 7, 
and these as false: 
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(18) The number of planets is necessarily greater than 7, 
(19) Necessarily if there is life on the Evening Star then there is life on the Morning Star, 
(20) 9 is possibly less than 7. 
The general idea of strict modalities is based on the putative notion of analyticity as 
follows: a statement of the form ‘Necessarily…’ is true if and only if the component 
statement which ‘necessarily’ governs is analytic, and a statement of the form 
‘Possibly…’ is false if and only if the negation of the component statement which 
‘possibly’ governs is analytic.” (Quine, 1961a, p. 143) 
The significant point to note in this passage is that the modal operators ‘Necessarily…’ and 
‘Possibly…’ invoked here are understood as involving what Quine calls ‘strict modalities’ which 
is equivalent to the notion of narrowly logical modality introduced above which are based only 
on formal definitions and logical relationships. Consequently, Quine is quite explicit in claiming 
that “Being necessarily or possibly thus and so is in general not a trait of the object concerned, 
but depends on the manner of referring to the object” (Quine, 1961a, p. 148). Although the 
argument holds true when the modality involved is narrowly logical, it does not if broadly 
logical modality is taken up. However, to reject the latter out of hand because “it leads us back 
into the metaphysical jungle of Aristotelian essentialism” (Quine, 1966a, p. 174) is simply to beg 
the question against those who take themselves to have an intuitive grasp of a notion of 
metaphysical modality based on the identities and natures of objects. 
Of course, Quine did recognise that his criticisms related “only to strict modality. For other 
sorts, for example, physical necessity and possibility, the first problem would be to formulate 
the notions clearly and exactly.” (Quine, 1961a, p. 158) However, Quine regarded such other 
modalities as dispensable, predicting that when science is complete it will make do without 
them. Given the current state of science his prediction is yet to be decided either way. But given 
the many uses of modality set out in the introduction, it seems unlikely to come true. Burgess 
provides a pithy summary of these conclusions: 
“For modal logic, the first lesson from Quine is that strict or (as many have called it) 
‘logical’ modality and subjunctive or (as we now call it) ‘metaphysical’ modality are 
distinct. A further lesson is that quantification into contexts of strict modality is difficult 
or impossible to make sense of. A yet further lesson is that quantification into contexts 
of subjunctive modality is virtually indispensable.” (Burgess, 1997, p. 54) 
4.1.5 Alternative logics 
Before ending this discussion of the logical modalities, one important feature of the discussion 
so far is worth drawing out. From the start, the logical modalities have been based upon the 
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principles of classical logic. This situation is unsurprising given the preference of philosophers 
for the laws of identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle. Indeed, “almost everyone 
agrees that contradictions are metaphysically impossible” (Sider, 2003, p. 181). As a 
consequence of this basis for broadly logical modality and hence metaphysical modality, there 
are no possible worlds in which contradictions hold true.  
Nevertheless, classical logic is by no means the only logic which philosophers have paid 
attention to. Paraconsistent logics allow for contradictions without generating patent 
absurdities. And if dialetheism is true, then it follows that not only are there possible worlds 
where contradictions hold but that the actual world is one of them. On the traditional 
understanding of possible worlds this would entail that the actual world is impossible. This 
counterintuitive implication for our ordinary understandings of possibility and impossibility is 
just another example of the radical consequences of dialetheism. 
Setting aside dialetheism, however, consideration of the existence of non-classical logics does 
seem to suggest that there might be worlds possessed of alternative logics. Indeed, it has been 
argued that logical possibility is itself a parochial notion and that logical impossibility does 
useful work in making sense of contradictory beliefs. On this account, logically possible worlds 
have the same logical laws as the actual world. Logically impossible worlds are distinguished by 
the extent to which their logical laws differ from our own (Yagisawa, 1988). Assessing all the 
implications of these developments, however, is beyond the scope of this essay. 
4.2 Scientific modality 
Another group of notions with which metaphysical modality has frequently been compared is 
that of scientific modality. Happily, understanding the connections between these notions is 
somewhat less problematic than comprehending the relationship between metaphysical and 
logical modality. The main reason for this is that advocates of the view that metaphysical 
modality should be identified with some form of scientific modality recognise that the proposal 
is contentious. Furthermore, there is greater awareness of where the various bones of 
contention are located. The crux of the debate ultimately turns on arguments about the 
character of laws of nature and the existence of so-called alien properties. But to begin with, 
scientific modality must be introduced and its assorted varieties delineated. 
One origin of this approach to pinpointing metaphysical modality can be found in a remark 
made by Kripke in Naming and Necessity: 
“characteristic theoretical identifications like ‘Heat is the motion of molecules’, are not 
contingent truths but necessary truths, and here of course I don’t mean just physically 
necessary, but necessary in the highest degree – whatever that means. (Physical 
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necessity, might turn out to be necessity in the highest degree. But that's a question 
which I don't wish to prejudge. At least for this sort of example, it might be that when 
something's physically necessary, it always is necessary tout court.)” (Kripke, 1980, p. 
99) 
On the not unreasonable assumption that what is ‘necessary in the highest degree’ or ‘necessary 
tout court’ is metaphysically necessary, the cautious suggestion here is that physical necessity 
might turn out to be identical to metaphysical necessity. In a postscript to the lectures, Kripke 
went on to say that “The question how far this can be pushed is one I leave for further work” 
(Kripke, 1980, p. 164). Unfortunately, this further work is yet to be published. 
Nonetheless, many philosophers took the hint and several expounded the view that 
metaphysical modality just is physical modality, or at least something like it. Taking into account 
the remarks above, it seems quite fair to describe this as an evolutionary, rather than a 
revolutionary, approach to metaphysical modality. However, it should also be noted that many 
such supporters pushed the matter farther than Kripke himself would have done: Shoemaker 
(1998, p. 76 n. 11), Edgington (2004, pp. 16-18) and Leeds (2007, pp. 460-461) notably reject 
the Kripkean argument for mind-body dualism. 
If it should turn out that metaphysical modality is identical to physical modality or something of 
that ilk and that the latter can be understood more adequately than the former, this would be 
extremely beneficial. Certainly, if metaphysical modality is reducible in this way, then much of 
the mystery and obscurity which has plagued the notion would be removed. And this outcome 
would be very valuable considering how hard it is for the novice “to understand the 
philosopher's favourite sense [of modality], according to which e.g. ‘It is possible that the 
Conservative Party won the last election’ is true, and ‘It is possible that a man lives for years 
unaided under water’ is true” (Edgington, 2004, p. 5). It would be welcome if something akin to 
physics could explain what unites these disparate phenomena. 
None of this talk of physical modality has been entirely unqualified so far. The justification for 
this is that there are at least three other modalities to which physical modality is very similar 
and it would be wrong to dismiss their respective claims to metaphysical modality out of hand. 
The close alternatives to physical modality are causal modality, nomic or nomological modality, 
and natural modality. It is worth spending some time to consider each of these four notions in 
turn. Doing so should bring out any parallels and disparities that exist between them and help 
evaluate which, if any, notion is to be preferred in accounting for metaphysical modality. 
It would be difficult if the results of this investigation suggested that there really exist four quite 
separate and genuine modalities, with each modality possessing its own unique modal strength. 
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If faced with the choice of identifying metaphysical modality with one of four genuine 
modalities, each with apparently equal claim to the title, it might be preferable to retain the 
obscurity of the original notion rather than select one arbitrarily. Thankfully, this particular 
outcome will be avoided because there are reasons to believe that the various notions are 
deeply interrelated and capable of integration, and to hope that on-going scientific endeavour 
will ultimately decide which adjective is the best moniker to capture metaphysical modality. In 
fact, because the issues about whether metaphysical modality should be identified with any of 
these four modalities at all are quite general, it will be seen that utilising scientific modality as a 
blanket term to assimilate the aforementioned modalities does no harm at all when in pursuit of 
the correct understanding of metaphysical modality. 
Before discussing these matters further, an essential caveat should be noted: to wit, that on the 
whole it is not the business of philosophy to prescribe rules for the conduct of science. 
Therefore, the ruminations which follow should not be seen as dictating where science 
currently is and where it should be going. Rather, the discussion should merely be seen as an 
executive summary of the terminological options for what can be broadly labelled scientific 
modality. Indeed, it is not unlikely that science will be the ultimate arbiter of the issues raised 
here about causation, laws of nature, and the statuses of physics and the special sciences. 
4.2.1 Physical modality 
Equating metaphysical modality with physical modality has been a standard version of the sort 
of approach to understanding metaphysical modality outlined above. Motivation for this view 
has derived from the quite evident fact that, from the dawn of the Scientific Revolution onward, 
fundamental physics has been at the forefront of attempts to understand the structure and 
workings of the world. Its huge range of predictive and explanatory successes has lent support 
to the thesis of physicalism, according to which everything is, or supervenes on, the physical. 
The latter comprises all those concrete, spatiotemporal objects and events, and mathematical 
structures postulated by physics including such entities fields, forces, particles, tensors and 
vectors. At least this is approximately correct; more accurately, what is physical refers to 
everything which remains part of physical theory as and when it is finally completed. 
Those who argue that metaphysical modality reduces to physical modality therefore claim that 
the equations of physics arbitrate what is metaphysically possible or necessary. On this account, 
assuming for the sake of argument that something like Einstein’s special theory of relativity is 
literally true physical theory, it is metaphysically impossible for a massive object to travel at 
speeds faster than the speed of light in a vacuum. Proponents of this view are aware that this 
conflicts with the traditional understanding of metaphysical modality according to which the 
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laws of physics are metaphysically contingent for their underlying premise is that the 
traditional notion is in desperate need of reform. 
Despite its illustrious pedigree, though, there are at least two reasons to spurn the label 
‘physical’ for the type of reduction of metaphysical modality envisaged here. The first one 
concerns the fate of the special sciences. Since it remains controversial what their status is, it is 
plausible that “a theory of modality should not prejudge the question whether all laws of nature 
are reducible to laws of physics” (Edgington, 2004, p. 2). The second has to do with the nature of 
mathematics. If it should turn out that physics requires a Platonic realm of mathematical 
entities, then “there will be real necessities there which may not be epistemically necessary” 
(Edgington, 2004, p. 2). In other words, there might be mathematical truths which the laws of 
physics do not specify that are nevertheless metaphysically necessary.14 
4.2.2 Causal modality 
Another version of this general approach to understanding metaphysical modality has been to 
identify it with causal modality. The notion of causal necessity, according to which an event of a 
given sort must follow that of another, is of longer standing than physical necessity since it 
extends back at least as far as Hume. Indeed, it has been alleged that, before Quine and Kripke 
entered the scene, “There was a time […] when it was widely accepted that there are just two 
kinds of necessity. There was logical necessity […] And there was causal necessity” (Shoemaker, 
1998, p. 59). Ironically, this notion of causal necessity was something of a misnomer. At the 
time, the predominant way of thinking about causality was more or less Humean. According to 
this view, causation consists in nothing more than the fact that events of one sort are constantly 
conjoined with events of another sort. The idea of necessary connection between events was 
nothing more than a mistaken projection of the mind onto the world, the result of a 
psychological constitution which expects the future to resemble the past. 
However, the notion of causal modality which is claimed to resemble metaphysical modality is 
quite different and its origins are far more recent. According to this view, 
“properties are individuated by their causal features – by what contribution they make 
to the causal powers of the things that have them, and also by how their instantiation 
can be caused. Collectively, causal features of this sort constitute the essence of a 
                                                             
14 Bricker (2008, p. 132 n. 18) makes the novel terminological suggestion that metaphysical modality 
should be restricted to the concrete realm. On this account, mathematical necessities involving abstract 
Platonic entities should not be considered metaphysically necessary. However, Bricker has a more 




property. So insofar as causal laws can be construed as describing the causal features of 
properties, they are necessary truths.” (Shoemaker, 1998, p. 61) 
Plainly, the notion of causation on display here is quite unlike the Humean notion. Firstly, the 
commitment to causal powers is staunchly realist. Secondly, any residue of contingency in 
causation is completely removed by the suggestion that properties should be identified by their 
causal relationships. For example, a characteristic property of salt is solubility in water under 
standard conditions. Granting the proposition that causal features such as this are 
metaphysically essential to being salt, it follows that it is metaphysically impossible for salt not 
to dissolve in water within those same environmental contexts. Yet again, protagonists of this 
viewpoint accept the result is counterintuitive for those still wedded to the metaphysical 
contingency of causation. Once more, it is urged that such people should seek a divorce. 
Nevertheless, there is a worry which should give backers of the reduction of metaphysical to 
causal modality pause for thought. Ultimately, it might turn out that causal powers have no 
theoretical role to play in science. Instead, there might only be certain correlations and 
functional relationships defined by mathematical equations. In which case, it would be right to 
declare that “causality […] like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a 
bygone age” (Russell, 1912-1913, p. 1). 
4.2.3 Nomic or nomological modality 
The notion of nomological or nomic modality has advantages over the previous two notions 
since its emphasis on laws or rules (from the Greek nomos) abstracts from concerns about 
whether it is appropriate to describe laws of nature as physical or causal. However, even this 
term has its problems. There is a risk that the origins of the term carry over certain legalistic 
undertones which are not congenial. The idea that the laws of nature are somehow legislated in 
some sense or other is not a feature which most advocates of this sort of position intend. There 
is a danger that “the notion of lawhood in use is a direct descendant of the theological views of 
Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz, who viewed laws as divine decrees concerning the clockwork of 
the world” (Schaffer, 2008, p. 95). 
4.2.4 Natural modality 
Some theorists have have turned to a broader notion of natural necessity. It has been argued 
that “natural necessity […] will be a paradigm of metaphysical necessity” (Edgington, 2004, p. 2) 
because “several features of natural laws […] are best explained by the view that laws involve 
properties, that this involvement takes the form of a genuine relation between properties, and, 
finally, that the relation is a metaphysically necessary one” (Swoyer, 1982, p. 203). The virtue of 
this terminology is that it more effectively captures the essence of this proposal for 
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understanding metaphysical modality. The mystique of metaphysical modality is supposed to 
subside when it is considered that it merely reflects the basic contours of the natural world. 
There are nevertheless two difficulties with this expression. The first worry is that talk about 
which possibilities are natural and unnatural (and which features of objects and systems are 
essential and which accidental) will be no more explanatory than appeals to the identity and 
nature of objects with which metaphysical modality began. Secondly, it is not unreasonable to 
be anxious about whether the notion of natural necessity retains residual connotations with 
pseudoscientific or Aristotelian conceptions of nature. Interpreting the proposal envisaged here 
in such a way would be thoroughly misleading. 
4.2.5 Scientific essentialism 
Overall, each of the four terminological options above has its deficiencies. However, what is 
constant between the various proposals is an appeal to scientific method and empirical research 
in determining what the extent and shape of metaphysical modality is. Indeed, at one time, there 
was something of a tradition of contrasting a down-to-earth and “common sense” (Rinaldi, 
1967, p. 81) notion of empirical possibility with a rather useless notion of logical possibility, “a 
debilitating term because it blurs the distinction between science and pseudoscience, one 
variant of science fiction” (Seddon, 1972, p. 481). However, as the latter author notes, even this 
terminology is not completely ideal because it too narrowly constricts the realm of possibilities 
to the current state of human understanding instead of capturing the key motivation of 
constraining metaphysical modality to the possibilities and necessities dictated by a completed 
science. 
Some term will have to be plumped for that characterises the general sort of approach to 
understanding modality that the various philosophers cited above would agree to. Given that 
the guiding commitment has been to scientific enquiry, it might as well be called ‘scientific 
modality’. 15 This can be used as a neutral term to refer to that variety of modality which science 
will come to decide is most appropriate. It is also highly suggestive of a prominent theory in this 
area, scientific essentialism, which commits itself to the view that the properties of, and 
relationships between, natural entities are essential to them and that laws of nature are 
therefore metaphysically necessary (Ellis, 2002, pp. 4-5). 
4.2.6 Scientific and metaphysical modality 
Having settled on terminology, the question of whether metaphysical modality can be reduced 
to scientific modality still needs to be assessed. If it should turn out to be plausible that there are 
                                                             
15 I owe the choice of this terminology to the suggestive title of a book by Bigelow & Pargetter (1990). 
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metaphysical possibilities which are not scientifically possible, then this would undermine the 
proposal to understand metaphysical modality in this fashion. The central topic in this debate 
concerns whether laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. According to the approach to 
metaphysical modality outlined here, the actual laws of nature dictate what is metaphysically 
possible just as much as they dictate what is scientifically possible. In other words, the 
metaphysical contingency of laws of nature is ruled out. 
The traditional Humean account of laws of nature considers them to be contingent. A more 
updated and sophisticated version of this sort of account is “known as the Mill-Ramsay-Lewis 
(MRL) approach” (Psillos, 2002, p. 148). According to this approach “a contingent generalisation 
is a law if and only if it appears as a theorem (or axiom) in each of the deductive systems that 
achieves a best combination of simplicity and strength” (Lewis, 1973, p. 73). In accordance with 
this ‘contingentist’ outlook, Lewis writes: 
“I believe that there are worlds where physics is different from the physics of our world, 
but none where logic and arithmetic are different from the logic and arithmetic of our 
world. This is nothing but the systematic expression of my naïve, prephilosophical 
opinion that physics could be different, but not logic or arithmetic. I do not know of any 
noncircular argument that I could give in favour of that opinion; but so long as that is my 
firm opinion nevertheless, I must make a place for it when I do metaphysics.” (Lewis, 
1973, p. 88) 
This view of laws of nature is not the only one available. On a realist view, such as the 
Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley (ADT) approach to laws of nature, “It is a law that all Fs are Gs if and 
only if there is a relation of nomic necessitation N(F, G) between the properties (universals) F-
ness and G-ness such that all Fs are Gs” (Psillos, 2002, p. 163). Combined with the scientific 
essentialist premise that the causal properties of objects are essential to them, it follows that 
laws of nature could not be otherwise. 
An example should help to illuminate the debate. Assuming for the sake of simplicity that 
Newtonian theory correctly describes this world, the gravitational force, F, between any two 
massive objects, m and m’, is equal to the inverse square of the distance between them, r, such 
that F = Gmm’/r2. According to the contingentist, this fact could have been otherwise. Gravity 
could have been governed by an inverse cube law instead, such that F = Gmm’/r3. According to 
the ‘necessitarian’ this is not so. On their account, the inverse square law is an essential feature 
of mass and of gravity. Even if such scientific essentialist premises are granted it seems that this 
is not sufficient to establish the identity of metaphysical and scientific modality. For although it 
follows that bodies with masses cannot but be attracted to each other according to the inverse 
square law, it does not preclude the existence of alien kinds and properties such as schbodies 
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with schmass which are attracted to each other in accordance with an inverse cube law. (Fine, 
2002, pp. 257-259) 
The truth or otherwise of scientific essentialism and the nature of natural laws remains highly 
controversial. But it seems that regardless of the outcome of this debate, there is still good 
reason to suppose that metaphysical possibility is more extensive than scientific possibility. 
Granting scientific essentialism does appear to change the nature of the discussion considerably, 
though. By definition, alien kinds and properties are those which are not actualised. If the 
decision as to whether or not metaphysical modality is coextensive with scientific modality is 
based solely on the existence or otherwise of alien kinds and properties, then it is plausible that 
those who claim that metaphysical possibility is more extensive than scientific possibility seem 
to be in a dialectically weaker position than they otherwise were. Some intuitions about 
modality are stronger than others: that I could have been a contender or that I could have had 
another sibling are possibilities close to my heart. It is less clear what intuition has to say about 
more exotic possibilities far removed from everyday human experience. Whether there might 
have been more or fewer fundamental sorts of fundamental things and whether alien properties 
and kinds exist are perhaps good examples of this. Indeed, Skyrms (1981) was prepared to “just 
bite the bullet [and] deny the modal intuition for alien properties” (Melia, 2008, p. 138). 
It is not clear how this sort of chasm can be spanned: 
“There seems to be a fundamental rift – unbridgeable by argument – between 
ontologically conservative philosophers who have, what Bertrand Russell called, ‘a 
robust sense of reality,’ and ontologically liberal philosophers who respond, echoing 
Hamlet: ‘there is more on heaven and earth than is dreamt of in your philosophy.’” 
(Bricker, 2008, p. 131) 
Equally, there is a stark divide in the preferred methodologies of different metaphysicians 
which profoundly affects their conception of metaphysical modality. While such philosophers as 
Bird (2005) and Skyrms (1979) make cases for the greater role of science and a posteriori 
discovery in metaphysics, modal thinking tends to feel more like an a priori activity than 
anything else, bound up with the philosophical imagination. Adjudicating this conflict ultimately 
depends on understanding the relationship between conceptual and metaphysical modality. 
4.3 Conceptual modality 
The final modality with which metaphysical modality is frequently contrasted is conceptual. 
Some aspects of this notion have already been touched upon in discussion of narrowly logical 
modality. A key feature was an a priori quality of access which is not shared by all broadly 
logical or metaphysical modalities. In light of this, the gap between conceptual and metaphysical 
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modality is likely to seem unbridgeable. However, there are different ways of conceiving 
possibilities and not all are hopeless. Although it is uncontroversial that the imagination is a 
fairly limited means of gauging possibilities, the notion of ideal conceivability in the limit, 
informed by a posteriori discoveries, seems closely tied to the limits of metaphysical possibility. 
Whether these two ultimately coincide will depend on preferences for a one- or two-
dimensionalist modal framework. 
4.3.1 Imagination 
Although human imagination has generally not been regarded as the most reliable modal 
indicator, it has been a popular means of entertaining possibilities. Although the notion can be 
extended to incorporate the other senses as well, it is traditionally limited to visual images and 
arguably it is therefore limited by the human constitution. For example, we find it difficult to 
imagine additional primary colours (Blackburn, 1986, p. 136) even though their metaphysical 
possibility is quite plausible. Indeed, there is some reason to think that other species possess 
this ability. We also know from drawings of impossible objects such as those of Maurits Cornelis 
Escher that visual representation can mislead.16  
4.3.2 Conceivability 
Conceivability goes beyond mere pictures and instead concerns the limits of what is intelligible. 
We are simply not able to make any sense of or to ‘do anything with’ notions of round squares 
or alternative arithmetics (Blackburn, 1986, p. 128). These examples are quite clearly different 
in kind from the example of our imaginative limits above; they are more nuanced and 
intellectual. 
Our conceptual faculties need not be deemed an infallible guide to possibility. Intuitions can be 
subject to further revision just as much as empirical discoveries can. But it is important to 
distinguish between prima facie and ideal conceivability: while the former is apt to be mistaken, 
the latter arguably entails metaphysical modality. Ultimately, modal theorising seems to be an 
inherently rational activity. It is this quality which links ideal conceivability and metaphysical 
possibility together: modal notions clearly include “rational notions, such as consistency and 
rational entailment, […] breaking the link between conceivability and possibility breaks the link 
between rationality and modality” (Chalmers, 1999, pp. 489-490). 
4.3.3 One-dimensionalism 
Kripke’s basic idea was founded on the notion of a rigid designator, a term which refers to one 
and the same object in all possible worlds in which the object exists. Kripke argued that proper 
                                                             
16 See Sorensen (2002) for examples of these pictures and further discussion. 
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names are rigid designators. Descriptions, however, are non-rigid and so may refer to different 
objects in different possible worlds. Furthermore, Kripke argued, natural kind terms behave in a 
way analogous to proper names in that they refer to the same sort of thing or stuff in all possible 
worlds. On this analysis, any identity statement involving rigid designators will be necessary. 
Strictly speaking, this will only be true when the object to which the rigid designator refers is a 
necessary existent. In this case, the designator is said to be strongly rigid. If the object is a 
contingent existent then its designator is weakly rigid. Planets, for example, are not typically 
considered necessary existents. Thus, the necessity of Hesperus is Phosphorus is formulated as: 
□ (if Hespurus exists, then Hesperus = Phosphorus) rather than simply □ (Hespurus = 
Phosphorus) (Fitch, 2004, pp. 95-96). 
Kripke’s derivation of the necessary a posteriori consists of the combination of an empirical 
discovery in this – the actual – world and an a priori principle regarding the necessity of identity 
or the essence of natural kinds. For example, the a posteriori necessity that water is H2O is 
comprised of the empirical discovery that water is comprised of H2O together with the a priori 
principle that chemical structure captures the essence of water. For Kripke, although it is 
conceivable that water has a different atomic formula, XYZ say (since its being H2O is not 
analytic or part of the concept of water), it is not possible. Given that water is H2O it is not 
possible for it to have been something else because being H2O is essential to its nature. The 
overall method is to examine our actual world and having done so to consider a counterfactual 
world in which certain things are different and to assess what we, in our language, would say 
about such a world. For instance, it is argued, in a counterfactual world in which the colourless, 
tasteless, potable liquid which we drink is XYZ, such a liquid would not be water even if the 
inhabitants of that world called it ‘water’ in their language. On this account, there appear to be 
more conceptually possible worlds than metaphysically possible worlds. 
4.3.4 Two-dimensionalism 
The reader will notice that the counterfactual assessment takes place from the perspective of 
our actual world. For an actualist about possible worlds such as Kripke, this way of proceeding 
is completely unsurprising. According to this view, our world is ontologically privileged: it is the 
only concretely existing world there is. Alternative possible worlds are merely stipulated, 
heuristic entities used instrumentally to test hypotheses about the nature of the real (actual) 
world. This interpretation, one-dimensional Kripkean model semantics, of modal systems is a 
natural one, but importantly it is not the only way to interpret modal frameworks. 
Two-dimensionalists argue that Kripke’s method can be seen as a special case of a more general 
model according to which the world which is to count as actual can be varied. On this account, 
other worlds can also be considered actual and counterfactual assessments can be made from 
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the perspective of those worlds. The adoption of this framework has an important consequence 
for understanding the difference between metaphysical and conceptual possibility. On this 
account, the space of metaphysically possible worlds is coextensive with the space of 
conceptually possible worlds so the difference between metaphysical possibility and conceptual 
possibility is not a difference in kind. Instead, metaphysical a posteriori necessities emerge as a 
result of epistemic perspective based on whichever world happens to be the actual one.  
5 Conclusion 
If nothing else, it should be evident from the preceding discussion that there are several 
different interpretations of metaphysical modality to be found within the philosophical 
literature. The ambiguity this generates is rarely confessed. By way of conclusion, then, it will be 
helpful to summarise just what these conflicting accounts are. Although the upshot is a 
somewhat disjointed picture of metaphysical modality, some key contours can be identified 
nonetheless. The main issues relate to whether metaphysical modality expresses what is 
ultimate in alethic modality and differing intuitions about whether empirical or speculative 
methods are most appropriate when engaging in philosophy. 
As far as can be ascertained, it is agreed by everyone that metaphysical modality is an alethic 
variety of modality. Beyond this, however, characterisations of the notion differ markedly. In 
particular, three sources of disagreement can be seen. Firstly, there is disagreement over 
whether the sense of modality in question is absolute or relative. Secondly, there is 
disagreement over whether the subject matter of the metaphysical is universal and all-
encompassing or restricted to a particular domain. Finally, there is disagreement as to whether 
metaphysical modality is to be distinguished according to the methods by which it is known or 
not. These disagreements are deeply interwoven but each will be considered in turn. 
Firstly, there is metaphysical modality understood as an absolute modality. This seems to be 
closest to the Kripkean (1980) notion of metaphysical necessity as truth in all possible worlds. 
The lack of a qualifier here is instructive because it is also the notion of modality whose subject 
matter is unrestricted and given by the nature and identity of all things (Fine, 1994). On this 
conception, metaphysical necessity is to be identified with broadly logical necessity. This 
includes necessities of all kinds including mathematical truths and the particular Kripkean 
examples of a priori and a posteriori necessities. One consequence of this point of view which is 
rarely commented upon is that the qualifier ‘metaphysical’ becomes in some ways misleading. It 
suggests the locution ‘compatible with the laws of metaphysics’ which is suggestive of a relative 
rather than an absolute modality. The notion involved here, though, is rather one of unqualified 
possibility, of possibility simpliciter. Accordingly, van Inwagen writes: 
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“What I have called possibility without qualification, some have called ‘absolute’ or 
‘intrinsic’ or ‘ontological’ or ‘metaphysical’ possibility. The first two seem good enough 
names. I don’t find ‘ontological’ or ‘metaphysical’ particularly appropriate tags, however. 
[…] An analogy is perhaps provided by ‘truth without qualification’ (as opposed, for 
example, to scientific, metaphorical, approximate or contingent truth). One might call 
‘truth without qualification’ ontological or metaphysical truth, but these wouldn’t be 
particularly appropriate tags.” (Inwagen, 2001, p. 249 n. 9) 
The generality of the Lewisian (1986) modal framework, on the other hand, according to which 
metaphysical possibilities are specified by means of accessibility relations between worlds, 
seems to allow the laws of metaphysics of any given world either to range over the entire space 
of possible worlds or to be restricted to a particular locale. On the latter interpretation, 
metaphysical modality is relative. It has been argued that the former is the ‘Standard 
Conception’ of metaphysical modality while the latter is the ‘Non-Standard Conception’ (Rosen, 
2006). It is therefore inappropriate to suggest Lewis was committed to the latter conception. 
However, that his framework permits it is not entirely insignificant since it suggests that 
“our discourse about necessity is shot through with ambiguity. The ambiguity only 
matters when we are discussing the modal status of metaphysical propositions – or 
perhaps the modal status of certain laws of nature. But when it does matter, we ignore it 
at our peril. We are inclined to believe that questions about the modal status of the 
claims of mathematics and metaphysics are unambiguous. But if I’m right, that is not so.” 
(Rosen, 2006, p. 38) 
Arguably one reason this ambiguity is seldom appreciated, though, is because metaphysicians 
do typically consider laws of metaphysics and metaphysical modality to be ultimate and 
fundamental. 
Secondly, there is metaphysical modality understood as being a species of modality defined by 
concern with a particular subject matter. In contrast to the approach just noted, the subject 
matter of metaphysical modality has sometimes been confined to concrete entities only in 
contrast with mathematical modality, which concerns abstract entities, and logical modality, 
which involves both (Bricker, 2008). However, it is unclear that this heterodox understanding of 
metaphysical modality offers any theoretical advantages over the traditional account which 
takes metaphysical modality to incorporate everything. 
Thirdly, there is metaphysical modality understood as being a species of modality which is 
defined by the way in which it is known. In this regard, a contrast between logical and 
metaphysical modality has been founded upon the idea that the former is known a priori 
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whereas the latter is known a posteriori. (Psillos, 2002, p. 173). Conversely, physical and 
metaphysical modalities have been distinguished by the former being known a posteriori and 
the latter being associated with statements known a priori. (Leeds, 2007, p. 459) Once again, 
though, these proposals for reform have not proved especially popular. 
Consequently, there are reasons to conclude that metaphysical modality is alethic, absolute and 
all-encompassing in its subject matter. Judging exactly how far out metaphysical possibility 
extends, however, is far more controversial. It was seen early on that many of the options for 
grounding modality suffered from an inability to give a satisfactory account of modal 
epistemology. This general problem is no less acute for metaphysical modality in particular. Put 
simply, intuitions about the role of a priori and a posteriori methods in philosophy are starkly 
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